Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

The State of Utah v. Wayne Jay Soules : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott Keith Wilson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Wesley M. Baden; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Soules, No. 20000099.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/403

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

umn

u m n ourrvuivit. ^wjr^i,

DOCUMENT
Kf-'U
45.9

BRIEF

DOCKET NO. ^ °

°93Cf

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 981311-CA

200000*1T- XT
WAYNE JAY SOULES,

Priority No. 12

Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
WESLEY M. BADEN
418 East Main, Suite 210
P.O. Box 537
Vernal, Utah 84078

FILE
MAR fi 1 ?Of!0

Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

WAYNE JAY SOULES,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 981311-CA

Priority No. 12

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
WESLEY M. BADEN
418 East Main, Suite 210
P.O. Box 537
Vernal, Utah 84078
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

...

ii

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . .

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

ARGUMENT

4

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS'CONCLUSION THAT
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL CLAIM WAS
WAIVED BY HIS GUILTY PLEA IS BASED UPON WELLESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AND DOES NOT WARRANT
CERTIORARI REVIEW

CONCLUSION

4
8

ADDENDUM
ADDENDUM A - State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA
(Utah App. December 30, 1999)
ADDENDUM B - Transcript (R.131:7-10)
ADDENDUM C - Transcript (R. 132:9-15)

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
United States v. Webb, 83 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1996)

6, 7

STATE CASES
Stateexrel. E.G.T., 808 P. 2d 138(UtahApp. 1991)

6

State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, 984 P.2d 382

8

State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418 (Utah 1998)

5

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989), quoting Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258 (1973)

5

DOCKETED CASES
State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA (Utah App. December 30, 1999)

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 46

1,7

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

WAYNE JAY SOULES,

Case No. 981311-CA

Priority No. 12

Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does the Petition demonstrate that the court of appeals' application of wellestablished precedent to find that defendant's guilty plea constituted a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects, including all alleged pre-plea constitutional violations, is
sufficiently "special and important'' to warrant certiorari review?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons.
The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on
the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision;
or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question
of municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural history. Defendant was charged with possession of
methamphetamine and amphetamine with intent to distribute (enhanced to first degree
felonies due to prior convictions and proximity to public property), possession of
marijuana, tampering with evidence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and assault
(R.32-34). A preliminary hearing was held (R.71), and defendant was bound over on
all charges (R.62). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence (R.79), which was
denied by the trial court (R. 132:8). Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and one count of possession of amphetamine
with the intent to distribute, reduced to second degree felonies (R. 132:15). The
remaining charges were then dismissed (R. 132:16). As part of the plea, defendant

2
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reserved the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress (R. 132:1415). Defendant was sentenced to Utah State Prison for a term of l-to-15 years on each
count, to be served concurrently (R. 115-116). In an unpublished Memorandum
Decision, the Utah Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed defendant's conviction.
State v. Soules, Case No. 981311-CA (Utah App. December 30, 1999) (Addendum A).
Statement of relevant facts. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical
evidence gathered by police in this case, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause
to detain him, a detention which led to his arrest and the discovery of the drugs which
formed the basis for the charges against him (R. 131:5-6).
At the beginning of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, defendant's
counsel requested a continuance of the hearing due to a conflict between defendant and
him (R.131:7-8) (Addendum B). The conflict apparently involved a disagreement over
whether defendant should accept a plea offer: "There's been a plea offer made in this
case. I think it's in his interest to accept the plea offer. He refuses." Id.
Defendant addressed the court personally, complaining that his counsel had not
given him enough information about the applicable law. Defendant did not request
substitution of counsel, asserting only that "if [counsel] feels he can't do this or that
there is too big of a conflict between me and him, I would like to maybe get a new
lawyer" (R. 131:9). The court responded by stating that no adequate grounds had been
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given for substitution of counsel, and denied the request to continue the suppression
hearing (R. 131:9-10).
Defendant later accepted a plea offer. At the change of plea hearing, the court
asked defendant a series of questions about his relationship with counsel, and defendant
informed the court that he had been able to fully discuss the issues with counsel and felt
confident and comfortable with his counsel's advice (R. 132:9-10) (Addendum C). In
changing his plea, defendant reserved only his right to appeal the court's ruling on his
motion to suppress (R. 132:13-15).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT
DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL CLAIM WAS
WAIVED BY HIS GUILTY PLEA IS BASED UPON WELLESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, AND DOES NOT WARRANT
CERTIORARI REVIEW
In support of his petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant challenges the court
of appeals' ruling that his guilty plea operated to waive his claim that the trial court
erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel, and argues that this issue is one of first
impression in Utah. Petition, p. 7. To the contrary, the court of appeals' decision
correctly applied well-established precedent which holds that a guilty plea operates as a
waiver of all non-jurisdictional claims of error.
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. Defendant's guilty plea was entered without reservation of any issue other than
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Under established precedent,
defendant's plea constitutes a waiver of all other claims of error in the trial court's
rulings prior to the plea.
4

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary
and intelligent character of the guilty plea.
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989), quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267, (1973). The court of appeals noted that defendant never asserted that
his guilty plea was anything other than voluntary and intelligent, and held that the issue
of whether the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel was waived by
defendant's guilty plea.
This waiver rule is well-established. "The general rule applicable in criminal
proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is
deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby
waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional
violations." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (citing cases); see also State v. Munson, 972
P.2d 418, 420 (Utah 1998) ("a knowing and voluntary guilty plea precludes reservation
of issues for appeal, even those concerning alleged pre-plea constitutional violations.");
5
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State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah App. 1991) (in order to raise a claim of
constitutional defects in pre-plea proceedings, "petitioner would only be entitled to
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea to show that the advice
he received from counsel in entering the plea did not meet the appropriate standards.").
In support of his petition for review, defendant does not argue that the issue
raised is of particular significance, asserting only that the application of the waiver rule
to the facts of this case is an issue of first impression. Petition, p. 7. In order to make
this assertion, however, defendant characterizes the issue raised by this case in a very
limited manner; i.e., "whether, when a defendant enters a Sery plea reserving the right
to appeal the outcome of a suppression hearing, he waives the right to appeal issues

:

concerning the manner in which the court conducted the hearing," citing United States
v. Webb, 83 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 1996). In Webb, the Seventh Circuit found that a
defendant's reservation of his right to appeal a suppression ruling included the right to
challenge the trial court's conduct of the suppression hearing itself, in which defendant
alleged that the trial judge improperly questioned the witnesses himself. Webb, 83 F.3d
at917.
The Webb ruling at most represents a minor corollary to the general rule of
waiver, and the court of appeals implicitly found that the specific application of the
waiver rule in Webb did not alter the analysis in this case. Indeed, the court in Webb
did not consider itself to be announcing a new rule, and dealt with the waiver issue in
6
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two sentences, without citation to other case law, simply as an application of the
general waiver rule to the particular facts of that case. Webb, 83 F.3d at 917. The
court of appeal's implicit finding that Webb is inapplicable to the specific facts of this
case is not the sort of "important question" of law that needs to be established by this
Court on certiorari review.
A writ of certiorari "will be granted only for special and important reasons."
Utah R. App. P. 46. Defendant's petition presents no question of constitutional
moment, no question of statutory interpretation, no conflict among panels, no departure
from settled law, no call to revisit an obsolescent rule, and no question of major
impact. The unanimous memorandum decision of the court of appeals simply applies a
well-settled waiver rule to the specific facts of this case, and has no continuing importance beyond this case.
Further, even if the analysis employed by the court in Webb were viewed as
significant extension of the general waiver rule, this Court's consideration of the
appropriateness of adopting that rule would not affect the outcome in this case.
Defendant does not challenge any rulings of the trial court in conducting the
suppression hearing itself, as was the case in Webb. The court of appeals was therefore
correct in finding that defendant's reservation of the right to appeal the trial court's
suppression ruling did not also reserve for appeal the entirely separate issue of whether
substitute counsel should have been appointed.
7
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. Finally, even if it were determined that the court of appeals erred in finding
that this issue was waived by defendant's plea, the trial court did not err in failing to
appoint substitute counsel. Both defendant and his counsel were given a full
opportunity to discuss their disagreement over whether defendant should accept a plea
offer, and the court properly found that such disagreement did not rise to a level
requiring appointment of substitute counsel (R. 131:7-10). The later plea colloquy in
which defendant asserted satisfaction with his ability to discuss the issues with counsel
confirms the fact that no conflict existed between them (R. 132:9-10). See State v.
Lovell, 1999 UT 40,1 f 27-35, 984 P.2d 382.
This Court should not grant certiorari to review whether the court of appeals
properly applied the uncontested waiver rule to the specific facts of this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the writ should not issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ J _ day of March, 2000
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed
byfirst-classmail this _J

March, 2000 to the following:
Wesley M. Baden
418 East Main, Suite 210
P.O. Box 537
Vernal, Utah 84078
Counsel for Defendant/Petitioner
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DEC 3 01999
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS '

§ i w

^

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
State of Utah,

^

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 981311-CA
F I L E D
(December 30, 1999)

Wayne Jay Soules,
1999 UT App 391
Defendant and Appellant.

Eighth District, Vernal Department
The Honorable John R. Anderson
^Attorneys: Wesley M. Baden, Vernal, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Scott Keith Wilson, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Soules appeals from guilty pleas to one count of possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to
distribute, and one count of possession of a controlled
substance, amphetamine, with intent to distribute. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1999). Soules entered a conditional guilty
plea, expressly reserving the right to appeal the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. See State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935, 938-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). He now argues (1) the
trial court erred when it denied him substitute appointed counsel
and (2) the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact
when it denied his motion to suppress. We affirm.
By pleading guilty, Soules waived all nonjurisdictional
defects, "including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations."
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); accord James
v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Examples
of such nonjurisdictional issues that may be waived by a guilty
plea ' involve [] . . . a number of important rights, including the
right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and
the privilege against self-incrimination.1" James, 965 P.2d at
571 (alterations in original) (quoting Salazar v. Warden, Utah
State Prison, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993)). Soules does not
challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea.
Further, he does not argue that his challenge is based on a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jurisdictional defect.1 Thus, we will not address his contention
that the trial court should have appointed substitute counsel.
Soules next argues the trial court's findings of fact were
insufficiently detailed to support its denial of Soules1s motion
to suppress. When findings of fact on a particular issue do not
appear on the record, ,Mwe "assume that the trier of [the] facts
found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the
decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find
facts to support it."1" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224
(Utah 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted)).
In this case, Soules's parole officer had the authority to
ask Soules questions. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
432, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 1144 (1984) (stating "the nature of
probation is such that probationers should expect to be
questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past
^criminality").2 The parole officer asked Soules whether he had
*been using drugs, and Soules admitted that he had. This
admission gave the parole officer the reasonable suspicion
necessary to perform a warrantless search. See State v. Davis,
965 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). We thus conclude the
trial court correctly denied Soulesfs motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm Soulesfs convictions,

-&.

Norman H. Jacksoj^ Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. Instead, he merely asserts that if the alleged error were
jurisdictional, it could not be waived. We agree. However,
Soules has not cited any legal authority to indicate that this is
the case.
2. When evaluating searches of probationers and parolees similar
considerations typically apply to each group. See State v.
Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 529 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing 4 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.10(c), at 767-69 (3d ed.
1996)).
981311-CA
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2

DAVIS, Judge (concurring):
The warrantless search conducted by the parole officer had
little, if anything, to do with the charges to which defendant
entered his Sery plea. See State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938-40
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). The drugs which were the subject matter of
the charges resulting in the plea were discovered while defendant
was booked into jail.
Based on defendant's involvement in the assault and his
admission to his parole officer that he had been using drugs, the
parole officer was justified in taking defendant into custody "on
a 72 hour hold," and it is well settled that contraband
discovered during the booking process is admissible. See State
v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding,
"piece of glass taken from defendant's pocket as part of an
inventory search during booking was legally seized, and was
prqpelTLy Admitted as evidence,") (citation omitted).

^. lZ,rfc&*

James JL'. Davisr"'w'1^'f',s ^
/
(/

981311-CA
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1

Your Honor.

2

that there would be an order from the court that the

3

document be sealed if it's offered into evidence.

4

don't intend to offer it into evidence.

5
6

MR. LUNNEN:

I

We can stipulate, I think, to

the time.

7
8

And I produced it on the understanding

THE COURT:
seal it.

9

If you want to offer it we'll

Okay?
MR. LUNNEN:

Now, I know you will.

All the.

10

witnesses are here.

I have done some research on this

11

case. And I want to put a few things on the record.

12

And Mr. Soules can respond if he would like to. I

13

have told Mr. Soules, I have advised him that there is

14

no legal issue of probable cause.

15

research on it.

16

mind, as his counselor, I have advised him there is no

17

issue of probable cause.

We disagree to that.

18

think we still disagree.

He believes there is an

19

issue.

20

to me that there is not an issue.

21

Mr. Soules and I have pretty hefty conflict because we

22

don't agree about anything.

23

frustrated with him because we just are completely at

24

odds.

25

to -- and I realize all the witnesses are here -- I

I have done the

I have looked at the facts.

In my

I

The case law that I have looked at indicates
I am concerned that

He's upset with me.

I am

The reason I am bringing this up is I like
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1

would like to ask for a continuance that he either be

2

allowed to obtain another attorney or that I have a

3

chance to go over this some more with him.

4

talked to him several times about this issue.

5

"• it's against his best interest.

I have
I think

There's been a plea

6

offer made in this case.

7

to accept the plea offer.

8

ethically bound to at least put it on the record that

9

in my mind there is no issue of probable cause.

10

I think it's in his interest
He refuses. And I feel

And I

just want it on the record, Your Honor.

11

Wayne may want to say some things.

12

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

I would like to speak.

13 •• Mr. Lunnen has seen me three times.

m

I am facing three

14

five to life's.

I feel this is a pretty big, pretty

15

important part of my case.

16

want to show him and present my case to him.

17

told - - h e told me he would be in here to see me every

18

day this week to prepare for this.

19

him.

20

phone.

21

morning in passing.

22

want to show him and present to him.

23

had a chance to present it to him.

24

comment to me that he has 240 active cases, that he

25

don't have the time to teach me the law.

I have more stuff that I *
I have

I have not seen

I have not been able to talk to him on the
The first time I talked to him was this
And I still got more stuff that I
And I ain't even
He's made the

I am not
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1

asking him to teach me the law.

2

to teach me a little bit about my case.

3

could go in this with my eyes open.

4

five to life's.

5

like to know what I am getting myself into before I

6

take a plea bargain.

7

case law# some case history, something to help me in

8

my mind believe that this is in my best interest.

9

I am just asking him
That way I

I mean, three

It's pretty big charges. And I would

And I would like to know some

I do feel there is some legitimate points in

10

my case. And I would like some -- I would like some

11

case law.

12

the jail, I have requested case law numerous amounts

13

of times, and they have told me that I had to go

14

through the County Attorney's Office and through my

15

lawyer.

16

I am fighting for everything I got here.

17

three five to life's is pretty steep.

18

think there is more that I need to present to

19

Mr. Lunnen.

20

there is too big of a conflict between me and him, I

21

would like to maybe get a new lawyer.

22

I got to say.

23

I have asked him, and I have asked through

I can't -- I ain't been able to get it yet.
I mean,

So I still

If he feels he can't do this or that

THE COURT:

Okay.

But that's all

At this point in time,

24

there are, sometimes, conflicts between the court --

25

or counsel and the client.

In this case, though, if
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1

Mr. Lunnen has a duty to proceed to represent your

2

interests, but the fact that you are not happy with

3

how he's proceeding, isn't grounds to get a new

4

attorney involved at this point.

5

This is a suppression motion.

Mr. Lunnen has

€

made a record indicating that he doesn't think

7

probable cause is an issue.

8

duty to proceed.

9

to supplement the probable cause hearing with a

But I guess he's got a

And we'll make a record if he wants

10

record, and he can develop his motion.

11

interest here is in protecting your rights and getting

12

this matter set for trial. Are you incarcerated

13

waiting trial in this matter?
•

14
15
16

MR. LUNNEN:
•

•

•

•

•

Fine.

-

My

•

•

•

Yes, he is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you on parole hold or any

other reason?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, I am on parole hold.

We are here today.

Let's develop

19

the record with what evidence Mr. Soules thinks would

20

be appropriate.

21

My interest, though, is to set the matter for trial if

22

the motion is not warranted.

23

won't, you know -- and you'll have enough time to

24

prepare your case.

25

In fact, I can't give you a trial date for a long

And I'll -- we'll hear the motion.

Or even if it is, that

This isn't the trial here today.
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1

likelihood would be looking at three to four years on

2

the second degree felony minimum until the Board of

3

Pardons decided to put you on parole.

4

you I'll send you to prison.

5

that you are looking at that as a maximum in the event

6

I don't give you probation.

7

apparently, you are on probation and the entry of this

8

plea here today will -- are you on probation or

9

parole?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

Ifm not telling

But I am telling you

You also have,

Parole.

The fact that you are on parole,

12

the entry of this plea will affect, may affect your

13

status parole, and you may have to go back anyway.

14

want you to know that going in.

15

that?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

I

Do you understand

Yes, I do.

Okay.

Knowing that those are the

18

risks, do you think it's in your best interest to

19

proceed in this manner or to go ahead and go to trial?

20
21
22

THE DEFENDANT:

I think this is in my best

interest.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Have you had time to weigh

23

the options,and take enough time with Mr. Lunnen to

24

,weigh what you are doing and make an intelligent

25

choice about your options?
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9

1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

2

THE COURT: Are you -- has he advised you?

3

Do you feel confident, comfortable with his advice?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

MR. LUNNEN: Not always, but --

6

THE COURT: Well --

7

THE DEFENDANT: What this (inaudible).

8

MR. LUNNEN:

9
10

nauseam.

We have discussed this ad

We have gone over this case many, many times

together.

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

I do.

I am asking him.
We do butt heads a lot. But,

yeah,. I do believe this is in my best interest.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LUNNEN:

Factual basis?
What happened was, when they got

16

down to the jail, he was being searched and had some

17

bags with methamphetamine and, I think, also some

18

marijuana concealed in his pants and, actually, in his

19

rectal area, I think.

20

discovered at that point and thrown across the room.

21

There was a little scuffle that took place and that's

22

where they were found.

23
24
25

They were pulled out and

THE COURT: Count Three talks about
amphetamines.
MR. LUNNEN:

Same thing.

It's just a
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1
2
3
4

different -THE COURT:

Count One talks about marijuana.

There were two substances.
THE DEFENDANT:

There was a joint and crank#

5

methamphetamine.

I had no clue that I had

6

amphetamine.

I was charged with methamphetamine and

7

amphetamine.

Frankly, the difference, I didn't even

8

know that there was a difference.

9

I had two different substances.

I didn't even know

I thought it was --

10

and my understanding it was all one substance, was all

11

the same stuff.

12

MR. LUNNEN:

It was later determined through

13

testing that one was amphetamine, apparently.

14

lesser of a pure, I guess.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. WALLENTINE:

It's a

One is just a salt of the other.
It is, Your Honor.

There

17

are two refinement processes, different methods of

18

manufacturing.

19
20
21
22
23

THE COURT:

How did you get to the

distribution quantity in the marijuana?
MR. LUNNEN:

That's not one of the ones that

he's pleading to.
MR. WALLENTINE: No.

It's the amphetamine

24

and methamphetamine.

There were 2.5 grams of

25

amphetamine, 1.3 grams of methamphetamine packaged
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1

together.

2
3

THE COURT:
methamphetamine.

I'm sorry.

Count 3 is amphetamine.

4

MR. WALLENTINE:

5

THE COURT:

6

Okay.

That's correct, Your Honor.

I misread that. All right.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

You are, except for the

issue you are preserving on appeal you are waiving all

10

of your defenses and all your rights, including a

11

right to pick a jury and go to trial on that.

12

understand that?

13
14

;

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Okay.

There is an affidavit on

the podium that sets forth all of your rights.

16

you read that?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

questions about it?

23

Do you

Yes, I do.

15

22

They

were packaged separately?

7

9

Count One is

Have

I have read it and signed it.

Do you understand it?
Yes, I do.

Have you asked Mr. Lunnen any

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I have. And he's

answered them all thoroughly.

24

THE COURT: Any other questions.

25

THE DEFENDANT: No.
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1

THE COURT: Okay.

You need make a motion

2

through him to withdraw this plea within 30 days or I

3

won't consider it. Go ahead and sign it if you are

4

satisfied.

5
6

MR. LUNNEN:

having him sign it again.

7
8

THE COURT: That's okay. Did you sign it
here?

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10
11

Yes, I did# .just now.

THE COURT: Okay.

I'll accept that.

Do you

have any questions of me?

12
13

He's already signed it, but I am

THE DEFENDANT:

I just -- I would like to ask

you something.

14

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

I'm on parole anyway, so I am

16

going back to prison when I am found guilty of these

17

charges.

18

I just ask -MR. LUNNEN:

He doesn't want to know about

19

sentencing yet.

20

any questions about this.

21

I think he wants to know if you have

THE COURT:

I'll let him talk to me later

22

about that.

23

questions about what's happening and what you are

24

doing?

25

But for right now, do you have any

THE DEFENDANT:

Just that I do - preserving
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•1

my right to appeal of evidentiary hearing and the

2

process the cops went about, because I honestly feel

3

there is big gaps that the cops -- I mean, on the

4

stand and all their different transcripts, there is a

5

bunch of lies -- well, maybe not lies, but they

6

proceeded differently than any other report they have

7

ever given, they proceeded differently.

8

there is a bunch of obscurities there that they have

9

done.

So I feel

10

THE COURT: And your right to appeal --

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

(inaudible)

--on this how they found the

13

evidence and your detention and so forth will be

14

preserved.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

All right.

That doesn't mean that -- I have

already ruled on those against you.

18

THE DEFENDANT:

I know.

19

heard all the evidence, though.

I feel you haven't

20

MR. LUNNEN:

That's why you are preserving -

21

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

22

THE COURT: Now, any other defenses, your

23

right to go to trial, pick a jury, you understand you

24

are giving up those rights?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I am.

Also, I
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1

understand that if I do beat on that right for appeal

2

that all of this is void, then I get to go back

3

through the process again, right?

4

THE COURT:

If the Court of Appeals reverses

5

me and says that the evidence should have been

6

suppressed, they will likely either discharge you,

7

dismiss the matter, or order a new trial.

8

come back to a new trial and the state won't have the

9

evidence, and then we'll see what happens.

Then you'll

You may

10

have to go -- you may have to have a trial again.

11

know, you may have to post a bond while you are in

12

trial. Any questions about that?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

-THE COURT:

You

No.

Okay.

To the charge contained in

15

Count One, second amended information, possession of

16

controlled substance with intent to distribute, a

17

second degree felony, on or about September 28th,

18

1997, what is your plea?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

Guilty.

To Count Three, possession of a

21

controlled substance with intent to distribute a

22

second degree felony, same date, different substance,

23

amphetamine, what is your plea?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Guilty.

The court will accept the pleas,
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